Ruminations: Mandates in the Louisiana Constitution of 1974; How Did They Fare? by Hargrave, Lee
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 58 | Number 2
Winter 1998
Ruminations: Mandates in the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974; How Did They Fare?
Lee Hargrave
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Lee Hargrave, Ruminations: Mandates in the Louisiana Constitution of 1974; How Did They Fare?, 58 La. L. Rev. (1998)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol58/iss2/1
Ruminations: Mandates in the Louisiana Constitution of
1974; How Did They Fare?
Lee Hargrave*
I. INTRODUCTION
A threshold issue for a legislative drafter is the type of sanction to impose
.upon a violator of a proposed legal rule. The amount of pain the legislator
chooses to impose will normally reflect the degree of deterrence that is sought,
which in turn will reflect the perceived seriousness of injury or risk of harm that
a violation of the rule entails. Criminal penalties, including death, imprisonment
or fines, are usually the most severe sanctions available. Probation and parole
may or may not be allowed. Administrative or civil penalties involving fines are
possible. Injunctions and damage awards to private persons are common in civil
litigation. Treble damages are a possibility. Rescission of agreements is a
possibility. Some violations of contract rules produce absolute nullities with
virtually no legal effect; others produce relative nullities that are given more
effect.'
At times, one also sees legislative documents that have no enforcement
mechanism and impose no sanctions. A legislator who cannot find the votes, for
example, to adopt a statute may be able to obtain a sense-of-the-house or sense-
of-the-senate resolution that is only precatory. Attempts to force administrators
of government departments to take some action often take that form. 2 State-
ments of intent and findings of fact may find their way into legislation before the
enacting clause; they are not rules, but attempts to guide courts in construing the
legal rules.' On occasion, the Louisiana Legislature has attempted to interpret
the purposes of prior legislatures, with little effect."
Copyright 1998, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Wex. S. Malone Professor of Law, LSU. Coordinator of legal research for the Louisiana
Constitutional Convention of 1973.
I. La. Civ. Code arts. 2030 and 2031 define absolute & relative nullities.
2. 1996 Louisiana House Concurrent Resolution No. 98 was "A Concurrent Resolution to
authorize and request the Department of Transportation and Development to erect signs on both the
eastbound and westbound lanes of 1-10 at the Cecilia-Henderson Exit and on the southbound and
northbound lanes of 1-49 at the Sunset-Grand Coteau Exit to notify the public that those exits provide
access to Amaudville."
3. Article Ill, section 14 of the Louisiana Constitution goes into great detail to preserve the rule
that only that which follows the enacting clause is law. It provides "The style of a law enacted by
the legislature shall be, 'Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana.'
4. A unique attempt was Act 727 of 1954 attempting to "interpret" Act 62 of 1912 to limit the
effect of the earlier prescriptive statute that had been construed to allow private citizens to own beds
of waterbodies. See 1954 La. Acts No. 727 and 1912 La. Acts No. 62. It was an attempt to
discredit the then-recently decided case of California Co. v. Price, 74 So. 2d I (La. 1954). That
attempt was criticized by Justice Summers, concurring in the denial of writs in State v. Cenac, 132
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Some statements of rules found in traditional statute form are merely moral
precepts without enforcement mechanisms, such as: "Married persons owe each
other fidelity .... " Systematic codes contain definitions that are borrowed
by other provisions, but which have no independent effect. It goes without
saying that a sophisticated legal system will use these and other devices-to prod
citizens to act according to a standard or punish them to discourage them from
violating a standard, with varying degrees of invasion of freedom.6 Courts must
be sensitive to those ranges of sanctions to be accurate in reflecting the
legislative goals in these matters.
In the same way, constitutional rules do not always apply with a uniform
level of authority. Drafters of constitutional provisions write rules with different
types of sanctions and enforcement devices. The informed group of sophisticated
drafters in the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973 (hereinafter"CC/73")
knew of these options quite well.7 If adherence to the purpose of the drafters
So. 2d 928 (La. 1961): "The Act of 1954 is an effort on the part of the legislature to render
nugatory the settled judicial construction of the 1912 act, by declaring that what an entirely different
Legislature had in mind over two generations before was a purpose and intent which is the very
antithesis of what has been judicially declared to be the 1912 Legislature's 'manifest purpose."' Id.
at 929. Also, "It is also a fundamental rule of constitutional law that the interpretation and
construction of legislative acts in litigation are matters exclusively within the province of the courts.
It does not lie within the domain of the lawmakers to interpret their- own laws." Id. at 930. The
court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So. 2d 576 (La. 1974), overruled Price, but did
not decide the validity of the 1954 act.
5. La. Civ. Code art. 98. Comment (d) states, "Under R.S. 9:291 spouses may not sue each
other during the existence of their marriage to enforce the obligations imposed by this Article."
Lack of fidelity may be grounds for a divorce, but here the enforcement mechanism is another
statute, not Article 98.
6. Perhaps an unsophisticated system can make such differentiations also. Consider the laws
requiring dogs to be kept on leashes at all times they are off the property of the owner. Such laws
are characteristically enforced by a small number of employees who are on duty from 8 a.m. to 5
p.m. Owners quickly learn to let their dogs loose early in the morning and then again in the
evenings.
7. Professor Mark T. Carleton described the delegates to the Louisiana Constitutional Convention
of 1973 [hereinafter "CC/7Y] as members of a public elite: "These educated, articulate, powerful,,
and relatively affluent Louisianians .... Mark T. Carleton, Elitism Sustained: The Louisiana
Constitution of 1974, 54 Tul. L. Rev. 560 (1980). He was referring in large part to the high
education level of the delegates, the large numbers of office holders, and the large number of
lawyers. His observation is accurate, but I hesitate to use the term "elite." Perhaps so in the sense
of there being office holders, lawyers and persons experienced in government affairs. But given the
practical jokes, nightly poker games, and general tenor associated with the CC/73 delegates, it is
difficult to think of them as elite in the sense of persons who would be welcome in the New Orleans
Boston Club.
Unlike the 1921 Constitutional Convention, which had virtually no staff support, CC/73 had on
hand 22 full-time researchers. See Edward Donald Grant, III, Institutionalization and Rational
Decision-Making: The Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973, at 136 (1981) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Tulane University, 1981) (on file with author). Also see Matthew J. Schott, A
Legal Monstrosity? The Constitution of 1921, in In Search of Fundamental Law: Louisiana's
Constitutions, 1812-1974, at 124 (Warren M. Billings and Edward F. Haas eds., U.S.L. 1993).
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is an important value in construction of the constitution, persons construing
provisions of the document must be sensitive to the degree of authority to give
the different provisions.
In the United States experience, for example, preambles are known by
drafters not to be a binding part of a constitution, but a statement of aspirations
and hopes. They are not drafted as specific, clear rules for courts to apply.'
During CC/73 committee debates, the preamble was referred to as "a homi-
ly-it's motherhood and apple pie and all those things."9 In presenting the
preamble to the convention, Committee Chairman Alphonse Jackson called it "a
philosophical sermon" and explained, "My statement was based on prior court
decisions and this was discussed at length and fully in the committee. And based
on the court decisions that we considered, we make the statement that no
Preamble has the force of law."' 0
The purist would provide for no other hortatory provisions in a constitution.
All other provisions would be self-enforcing. This approach would have the
document speak in one tone of voice for all provisions. However, CC/73 was
not composed of technical purists. The delegates insisted on drafting the initial
proposals themselves, resulting in a more politically-oriented document. In that
process, a number of tones of voice emerged.
I. VARIOUS TONES OF VOICE
The simplest and most authoritative tone of voice for the drafter to use is to
address a rule to the courts. Typical are bill of rights procedural guarantees.
Every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty;" excessive bail shall not
be required; 2 cruel, excessive or unusual punishment shall not be imposed. 3
Also, provisions granting jurisdiction to courts are common, as "The supreme
court has exclusive original jurisdiction of disciplinary proceedings against a
member of the bar."' 4 These provisions are self-enforcing in the sense that they
do not require legislation to implement them. Of course, the legislature cannot
alter them.
One tone of voice limits the rule to regulating state action. The constitution
provides that "No law" shall restrain speech or religion.' 5 In a country that
espouses judicial review, this formula sets a standard for courts to test the
8. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. II, 22, 25 S. Ct. 358, 359 (1905) (citing I J. Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 462 (1883)).
9. Gerald Moses, Proposed Preamble Ok'd by Convention Committee, Baton Rouge Morning
Advocate, March 18, 1973, at 8-A, col. 4.
10. VI Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts 991
\[hereinafter "Records: Convention Transcripts"].
I1. La. Const. art. 1, § 16.
12. La. Const. art. I, § 18.
13. La. Const. art. I, § 20.
14. La. Const. art. V, § 5(B).
15. La. Const. art. 1, §§ 7, 8.
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validity of laws. A rule can go beyond state action in the form of laws and
cover the action of state officers and other state actors. Louisiana Constitution
article I, section 4, for example, deals with searches and seizures by state agents,
who are told that "Personal effects shall never be taken."
The drafter can go further and extend the rule to relations between private
citizens. Article I, section 12, for example, provides that in access to public
accommodations, every person shall be free from discrimination. The rule, by
its terms, is not only self-enforcing; it goes beyond state action and reaches
individual action. It governs private conduct without the need for legislation.
Another variation has the drafter speaking conditionally. In establishing a
right to keep and bear arms, Article I, section 11 begins with the strong
statement, "The right of each citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be
abridged .... " It continues with an exception, "but this provision shall not
prevent the passage of laws to prohibit the carrying of weapons concealed on the
person." The drafter granted the legislature the power to make an exception to
the rule. But not a blanket exception. The legislature cannot prohibit the
carrying of weapons being concealed in any other place.' Normally, the
legislature does not need to be empowered to act, but if in the case of an
exception to a constitutional rule, it must be empowered. By the terms of the
provision, the legislature is not required to make the exception; it is only
empowered to do so.
The drafters used an even less authoritative tone of voice in Article I, section
13, "The legislature shall provide for a uniform system for securing and
compensating qualified counsel for indigents." The statement is addressed to the
legislature rather than to the courts or to the general population. It provides no
sanction in case of the legislature's failure to act. Perhaps not a preamble, but
almost as general and without sanctions. Louisiana is by no means unique in
adopting "the legislature shall" mandates.
For example, the constitution of Oklahoma provides that the legislature shall
establish and maintain a system of free public schools; and shall make provision
for decennial revisions of the statutes; and shall make a legislative reapportion-
ment every ten years. There is no power in the court nor in any other
department of the state government to compel affirmative legislative action, and
provisions depending upon such action must to the extent of such dependence be
directory.'7
The view that courts cannot order legislators to adopt legislation to
reapportion themselves was the premise behind Article III, section 6, which
provides that if the legislature does not reapportion itself, any elector can petition
the supreme court to do so, and the court is required to do the reapportionment.
16. Lee Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution: A Reference Guide 34 (Greenwood Press
1991).
17. Walter Dodd, Judicially Non-Enforceable Provisions of Constitutions, 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 54,
79(1931).
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This solution is adopted rather than having the court order the legislature to do
so. This is the pattern developed in the federal cases, in which federal courts
reapportioned legislatures if the latter choose not to do so.'s
In any event, the authoritative tone of a provision is a matter of much
nuance and complexity. The attentive interpreter of the constitution must work
within the limits of these nuances if he wants to remain faithful 9 to the purpose
of the drafters.2" The purpose of this article is to investigate the extent to
which the mandates of CC/73 have been construed consistently with the purpose
of the drafters of those mandates.
III. COUNSEL FOR INDIGENTS-ARTICLE I, SECTION 13, SUBSECTION 2
The legislature shall provide for a uniform system for securing and
compensating qualified counsel for indigents.
Perhaps the most instructive example of how unenforceable mandates come
about is the process by which the "counsel for indigent defendants" provision
developed in CC/73. The Bill of Rights Committee, reflecting the approach of
the legal experts, proposed a traditional, self-enforcing rule directed to the courts:
"At all stages of the proceedings, every person shall be entitled to assistance of
counsel of his choice, or appointed by the court in indigent cases if charged with
an offense punishable by imprisonment."'"
18. See Hays v. State, 936 F. Supp. 360, 372 (W.D. La. 1996) (three-judge court): "Even now,
the Legislature persists in defending the indefensible. In its record of doggedly clinging to an
obviously unconstitutional plan, the Legislature has left us no basis for believing that, given yet
another chance, it would produce a constitutional plan. It is therefore with regret and reluctance, but
with no other choice perceived, that we hold as follows ...." The court then imposed its own
redistricting plan.
19. For an exhaustive discussion, see Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 Fordham
L. Rev. #4 (1977), which devotes 572 pages to the subject. To the extent that there exists a problem
differentiating, with respect to the United States Constitution, "the distinction between semantic
intention (what the Framers meant to say) and political or expectation intention (what they expected
would be the consequence of their saying it)," the problem does not arise in dealing with the recently
adopted Louisiana Constitution. See Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism,
Scalia. Tribe and Nerve, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1249, 1256 (1997). Only as one gets further away
in time from the knowledge and understanding of the writers does the problem arise. Id.
20. Note the importance of the text and purpose of the rule in Cotton v. Brien, 6 Rob. 115 (La.
1843). The Mississippi constitutional provision provided "that the introduction of slaves into this
State as merchandize, or for sale, shall be prohibited from and after the first day of May, 1833." Id.
at 116. This was a general prohibitory statement rather than a statement instructing the legislature
to prohibit. The Louisiana Supreme Court construed the statute as self-enforcing, and that a contract
of sale which violated the provision was unenforceable.
21. Committee Proposal 25, § 12, at IV Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of
1973: Convention Instrument, at 235.
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That provision provoked little opposition or discussion, presumably because
it expanded only slightly the existing state of the law under the federal cases."
It simply addressed an indigent individual's right not to be tried without a free
lawyer. It remains in the constitution as the basic rule. During floor debate on
the proposal, Delegate Thomas A. Velazquez, not a member of the committee
and not a lawyer, proposed an amendment that was aimed at further implement-
ing the guarantee. His proposal added the language: "the legislature shall
provide for a uniform system for securing counsel for indigents including
qualifications and compensation." He stated, "This is not an attempt to suppress
or supplant Section 12; it's rather a supplement. It puts the exact mechanism in
the hands of the legislature where it belongs. It only mandates the legislature to
provide for a uniform system .... It could be a combination of the old and the
new. It could be a completely old system. It could be a completely new
system." 3
As he stated, the drafter knew the proposal was not self-enforcing. But it
was a proposal with political significance coming from a black delegate from
New Orleans who stated, "This is a bill to help poor citizens who have been
accused of crime. If the poorest citizen of this state can't receive justice, then
no citizen is safe. "2' Despite the use of the word "uniform," the proposal as he
explained it did not require that the same system be implemented in every
jurisdiction. Perhaps an odd use of the term uniform in this context; perhaps
unnecessary. As he said in explanation, "you can pass an ice cream law that
covers chocolate ice cream, vanilla ice cream, fudge ripple, and chocolate walnut,
and it would still be a uniform ice cream law., 2 5 More to the point, he stated
he meant "Uniform in that justice is given to indigents. This is the basis of the
uniformity, and the method is left to the legislature of which you are a member;
and I'm sure that if you want that particular system, then you go to the
legislature and you stress it."2
6
A committee member pointed out that the proposal did not accomplish much
that was not already provided for. The author's answer was, "As important as
the letter of the law, is the spirit of the law. Indigents and the concept of
indigent defense deserves constitutional treatment.""
In the end, the grass roots politics prevailed over the technicians, and the
admittedly unenforceable mandate was put into the document. Not a rule, but
a "concept." Not a constitutional rule, but "constitutional treatment." As
22. Lee Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 La. L.
Rev. 1, 45 (1974).
23. VII Records: Convention Transcripts, supra note 10, at 1160.
24. Id. An example of the political use of mandates to prod further action is shown in Norma
Rotunno, Note, State Constitutional Social Welfare Provisions and the Right to Housing, I Hofstra
Law & Pol. Symp. ill, 141 (1996).
25. VII Records: Convention Transcripts, supra note 10, at 1160.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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Delegate Duval told the convention, "I think that this convention should go on
record mandating the legislature to establish some type of uniform system with
the hope that we will ultimately end up with a public defender system for
indigent persons accused of crime."2 A "hope," but not a binding rule.
Soon after the constitution went into effect, attorneys appointed to represent
indigent defendants without pay were the first to invoke the constitutional
mandate. In State v. Bryant,29 appointed attorneys moved to stay the prosecu-
tion and revoke their appointments, or to order the state to pay them reasonable
compensation. Their principal argument was that the existing system did not
meet the uniformity requirement, some districts having public defenders and
others using defender boards that appointed private attorneys. The supreme court
denied the requests, citing the debates just mentioned to support the view that the
system did not violate the uniformity requirement. The supreme court also
would not allow lower courts to order payments to attorneys. In State v.
Campbell,3" it reversed a lower court decision that ordered the Baton Rouge
local government to make payments to appointed attorneys. In State v.
Cummings,3' it reversed a judgment ordering the state and the state treasurer to
pay attorney fees and expenses. Serving on the court at the time were Justices
Albert Tate, Jr. and James L. Dennis, both of whom had served as delegates to
the constitutional convention.
Several years later, attorneys sought compensation for their expenses and an
hourly fee. Their argument combined the mandate's limited force with an
argument based on the self-enforcing guarantee to adequate counsel. The
argument was that uncompensated counsel was not effective and that attorneys
were not required to provide free representation under the rules of legal ethics.
Still, the court of appeal followed the Bryant rationale as to the unenforceability
of the mandate; it noted "that the constitutional mandate to provide a system, or
systems a la Bryant, to compensate counsel for indigent defendants in Louisiana
is squarely directed at the Legislature." 32
These developments are consistent with the convention debates. The
delegates intended only a hortatory statement. But this is not to say that the
mandate was not without some effect in the political realm. The legislature
responded in 1976"' to adopt a statewide system with a statewide board and a
board in each judicial district. Each local board maintained a panel of volunteer
attorneys and an involuntary panel. The law allowed the boards to adopt either
a plan for appointment of attorneys or for an indigent defender system. Funding
was provided by authorizing assessment of court costs for each felony conviction
28. Id. at 1161.
29. 324 So. 2d 389 (La. 1975).
30. 324 So. 2d 395 (La. 1975).
31. 324 So. 2d 401 (La. 1975).
32. In re Compensation for Indigents' Criminal Defense, 580 So. 2d 1058, 1060-61 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1991).
33. 1976 La. Acts No. 653.
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and misdemeanor violation, other than non-moving traffic violations."' While
not truly uniform and not well-financed, it was an attempt by the legislature to
fund the mandate, partly at the urging of Robert G. Pugh, who himself was a
delegate to CC/73.3s
Concerns about the quality of legal representation of indigents, especially in
Orleans Parish, provoked the next round of litigation. This time, however, the
proponents36 did not rest so much on the unenforceable mandate, but on the
argument that appointed counsel were not able to provide effective assistance
because of the lack of resources. Assuming that was the case, they then argued
that the courts had the inherent power to force other branches of government to
provide more funds to provide adequate counsel, as had been done in some other
states.
In State v. Peart,7 the lower court judge, in a broad order, found that the
system was unconstitutional as applied to Orleans Parish and ordered the
legislature to provide funding for improved services. The supreme court reversed
the broad order, but it did agree that services of counsel were ineffective in
Section E of the Orleans Criminal Court. It remanded for hearings in individual
cases to determine if effective assistance was provided. If counsel was found to
be not effective, the judge "shall not permit the trial of such cases to be
conducted."38
In Peart, the supreme court reaffirmed the view that the mandate to establish
a uniform system for compensating counsel was not enforceable by an individual
criminal defendant. It did state, however, in a tip of the hat to the mandate, that
"the existence of this provision in the constitution may well bolster this Court's
existing constitutional, supervisory and inherent authority to ensure that indigent
defendants receive the effective assistance of counsel the constitution guarantees
them."39 It also stated that the provision does not require the legislature to fund
the system of compensation; it only requires the legislature to provide a uniform
system. In so doing, the legislature could require local governments to fund it.
Thus, the result was a traditional approach to the guarantee with individual
remedies, rather than adopting systemic remedies. The majority, however, did
cite other jurisdictions which undertook broader system remedies 0 and noted
its inherent power and its supervisory jurdiction. However, it stated, "We
decline at this time to undertake these more intrusive and specific measures
because this Court should not lightly tread in the affairs of other branches of
34. Id. Section 149 of the old statute and Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure articles 512 and
513 have been amended and re-enacted.
35. Robert G. Pugh, The Uniform Indigent Defender Act, 24 La. B.J. 137 (1976).
36. Several amicus briefs were filed by activist organizations; see State v. Pearl, 621 So. 2d 780,
789 n.7 (La. 1993).
37. 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993).
38. Id. at 783.
39. Id. at 786.
40. Id. at 790.
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government and because the legislature ought to assess such measures in the first
instance." '41 Unstated in this discussion was the additional, and probably
insurmountable, hurdle of Article III, section 16 which provides that "no money
shall be withdrawn from the state treasury except through specific appropria-
tion . .. ." As stated in a perceptive student note:
The weakness of these so-called mandates lies in the constitutional rule
that there can be no expenditure of state funds without a legislative
appropriation. Although the constitution may say that appropriations
shall be made, it also leaves the power to do so in the hands of the
legislature. Abuse of legislative discretion to dictate exactly "how much
is enough" leads to a possible consideration of the inherent powers
doctrine but, without enforceable constitutional or statutory language,
the chances of a successful breach of the legislature's powers of the
purse are nonexistent.42
Justice Lemmon in a short dissent, without citing authority, suggested that
the legislature should be required to enhance supplemental funding "within a
specified reasonable time, for compensating indigent defender attorneys according
to uniform standards and guidelines so that at least minimally adequate programs
will operate in all of the various judicial districts."'" In a longer dissent, Justice
Dennis stressed the duty to implement the state and federal right to counsel for
indigents.
In any event, this convoluted development reinforces the view that the
language "the legislature shall" in Article I, section 13 is a hortatory statement
and cannot be enforced by courts ordering the legislature to enact legislation or
to appropriate funds. Here, the development in the cases has been faithful to the
text and to the purpose of the delegates. Other states have taken a similar view
of mandates to provide social services."
41. Id. at 791.
42. Andre Douget, Note, McCain v. Grant Parish Police Jury: Judicial Use of the Inherent
Powers Doctrine to Compel Adequate Judicial Funding, 46 La. L. Rev. 157, 165-66 (1985).
43. Peart, 621 So. 2d at 792.
44. Montana's constitution contains a high sounding provision that "the legislature shall provide
for economic assistance and social rehabilitation services as may be necessary for those inhabitants
who ... may have need for the aid of society." Mont. Const. art. X11, § 3(3). It has not been
directly enforced by courts ordering statutes to be enacted by the legislature, but was one policy
concern that led the court, in an equal protection analysis, to require higher-than-normal scrutiny of
classifications. Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309 (Mont. 1986). Also not directly
enforced was a New York Constitution mandate to aid the needy "as the legislature may from time
to time determine." N.Y. Const. art. XVII, § 1. However, a legislative mandate to a commissioner
was enforced. Jiggets v. Grinker, 553 N.E.2d 570 (N.Y. 1990). In such cases, "Unless the
legislature has mandated the level of aid in its statute, courts have deferred to legislative and agency
determinations of benefit levels despite the presence of a constitutional provision mandating aid."
See Rotunno, supra note 24, at 141.
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This is not to say that there may have been some political and/or moral
pressure generated by the mandate that propelled the legislature to act. Prodded
by the chiefjustice and members of the bar, the legislature has recently adopted
a new Indigent Defense Assistance Board and appropriated $7.5 million to
supplement local funds generated from indigent defense programs."
IV. NATURAL RESOURCES ARTICLE IX, SECTION I
The natural resources of the state, including air and water, and the
healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the environment shall
be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and
consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people. The
legislature shall enact laws to implement this policy.
As the title of the provision and the second sentence indicate, the first
sentence of Article IX, section 1 is a statement of general policy aimed at the
legislature rather than a self-enforcing rule directed to courts. The debate on the
provision shows that the mandate to the legislature was not designed for court
enforcement; it was adopted instead of a provision establishing a self-executing
constitutional right.
The Natural Resources & Environment Committee had before it a recom-
mendation from the Ecology Center of Louisiana to adopt "a Natural Resources
Bill of Rights statement, enumerating these ideas-(1) the wise use of all
resources be guaranteed to be for the benefit of all the people for all time; (2)
that this be made the mandate of the legislature; [and] (3) that there be provision
for redress in the courts to insure that this mandate is accomplished.""6 Early
in its debates, the committee posited the problem: "Mr. Hargrave pointed out
that the crux of the issue is whether such a provision should be drafted to allow
judicial review rather than merely to provide a legislative mandate."47 The
committee had before it two contrasting provisions of the Illinois Constitution:
45. In 1993, just before Pears was decided, legislation to provide better funding for indigent
defense was defeated. Kevin McGill, Public Defender Program Overhaul Rejected, Baton Rouge
Sunday Advocate, July 4, 1993, at 4E, available in 1993 WL 7085171. The legislature did provide
$5 million additional funds in 1994 and 1995. Carl Redman, House Committee Halves Indigent
Board Budget, Baton Rouge Advocate, May 2, 1995, at 4A, available in 1995 WL 6327391; Susan
Finch, $3 Million Ok'd to Defend State's Poor, New Orleans Times-Picayune, May 24, 1994, at B4,
available in 1994 WL 3836816; Jack Wardlaw, Legal Defense Fund Cut by Panel, New Orleans
Times-Picayune, May 2, 1995, at A3, available in 1995 WL 6072160. See 1997 HB I, appropriating
$7.5 million to the Louisiana Indigent Defender Assistance Board. Budget item 20-945.
Also, after a report by an advisory commission, the 1997 legislature established the Indigent
Defense Assistance Board, La. IS. 15:151, enacted by 1997 La. Acts No. 1361.
46. XIII Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Committee Documents 483
[hereinafter "Records: Committee Documents"].
47. XIII Records: Committee Documents, supra note 46, at 484 (Minutes of March 24, 1973).
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Section 1. PUBLIC POLICY-LEGISLATIVE RESPONSIBILITY
The public policy of the State and the duty of each person is to
provide and maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of this and
future generations. The General Assembly shall provide by law for the
implementation and enforcement of this public policy.
Section 2. RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS
Each person has the right to a healthful environment. Each person
may enforce this right against any party, governmental or private,
through appropriate legal proceedings subject to reasonable limitation
and regulation as the General Assembly may provide by law.
A legal aid attorney recommended an "environmental bill of rights" be
adopted, one that did not use vague terms making the state a trustee. She
recommended adoption of a provision providing, "The right of the people to
clean air, pure water, freedom from excessive and unnecessary noise, and the
natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic qualities of the environment shall not be
abridged."" A special counsel in the Office of the Attorney General provided
samples of self-enforcing provisions contrasted with statements of policy.49
With this and other information providing a clear background, Delegate
Derbes moved to add language, "In accordance with the public policy expressed
herein, each person has a right to a healthful environment.'! The motion failed
by a vote of 7 Yeas and 7 Nays5" and the self-enforcing right was not part of
the committee proposal presented to the convention. Addressing the full
convention, the chairman of the committee, Delegate Louis Lambert, a lawyer
and a legislator, explained the
policy statement on the environment. We took a presently existing
statement in our constitution ... in our present constitution which reads
as follows: "The natural resources of the state shall be protected,
conserved, and replenished." This particular language is found as a
preamble to the present constitutional provision concerning the Wildlife
and Fisheries Commission.
What we attempted to do is to strike a balance, or find a happy
medium between the environmentalists on one side, and the agri-
industrial interest on the other side. We feel that we have found,
hopefully, a policy statement that does this-that strikes a balance, that
is not extreme one way or the other. We heard amendments by
members of our committee who wanted to provide a citizen with the
right to sue in our constitution. In other words, the right to file a suit
48. XIII Records: Committee Documents, supra note 46. at 526 (Statement of Doris Falken-
heimer, Legal Aid Society of Baton Rouge.)
49. Id. at 532. See also id at 535.
50. Id. at 545.
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to close, for example, to seek an injunction to close down some
industry, let's say, or... [t]he majority of the members of our
committee felt that this was an extreme position because there are
provisions in our present law, in our civil code, our nuisance laws, class
action provisions in our ... Code of Civil Procedure, that provide
this.5
The convention adopted the committee mandate by vote of 98-0.2
Given this background, it should be clear that the high-sounding statement
is a generalized goal, but that the legislature is the ultimate determinant of the
exact nature of the rules to be adopted. That view has been adopted in the
construction of this provision by the courts. Though it is cited in a number of
opinions, at base the mandate is relied upon to support a general policy favorable
to environmental concerns and as an aid in construing statutes and regulations,
rather than as an independent rule.
In this regard, the Louisiana courts' position is much like Pennsylvania's.
There, a constitutional amendment provided, "The people have a right to clean
air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic
values of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the
common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As
trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them
for the benefit of all the people." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held it was
not a self-executing provision, but a moral directive to the legislature.5"
In Save Ourselves Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental Control Commission,"
Justice Dennis referred to the mandate, along with many other authorities, to
support finding an obligation on the Environmental Control Commission (ECC)
to consider certain matters in granting permits. The rule put forth there is
similar to the federal rule that was derived from statutes similar to the state
statutes governing the ECC,55 as well as from numerous policy arguments
drawn from state statutes. As I stated elsewhere, in using the term "public trust
doctrine" in relation to the mandate,
Justice Dennis is using it in a general policy sense and not in the strict
sense of a court's power to control state use of sovereignty land absent
a statute. Justice Dennis was a delegate to the Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1973 and voted for the proposal that became Article IX, Section
51. IX Records: Convention Transcripts, supra note 10, at 2912.
52. Id. at 2913.
53. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973). See
also Jose Fernandez, State Constitutions. Environmental Rights Provisions, and the Doctrine of Self-
Execution: A Political Question?, 17 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 333 (1993).
54. 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984).
55. Greg L. Johnson, Comment, Constitutional Environmental Protection in Louisiana: Losing
the Reason in the Rule of Reasonableness, 42 Loy. L. Rev. 97, 109 (1996).
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1-for a general policy statement rather than a self-executing constitu-
tional right.'
Indeed, one of the basic uses of an unenforceable mandate is to support policy
arguments for a particular construction of a statute. "Constitutional policy can
provide a valuable aid in determining the legitimate boundaries of statutory
meaning. Public policy which has a constitutional source can provide the basis
for a broad or narrow interpretation of a statute. In like manner, it is possible
to refer to analogous constitutional provisions to help shape the statute to accord
with the statutory aim or objective."'"
Justice Dennis was also trying to push the policy beyond its constitutional
text by his restatement of the mandate. He quotes the mandate to "enact laws
to implement this policy" but then explains that it is a mandate to "enact laws
to implementfully this policy."58 It is up to the legislature to decide how fully
to implement the policy. Similarly, the constitution simply states that various
values shall be protected. Logically, it would follow that the protection is
explained in the next sentence-by the legislature which makes laws. Justice
Dennis, however, offers the explanation that the first sentence "imposes a duty
of environmental protection on all state agencies and officials." Perhaps so, but
not one enforceable directly by courts if the purpose of the drafters is followed.
It is the legislature that is mandated. 9
The legislature, of course, has adopted and amended a substantial body of
legislation dealing with control of hazardous wastes and requiring permits for
various activities harmful to the environment, and the courts have not been given
an opportunity to innovate in a vacuum. Where there is uncertainty in the
intertistices, an area where policy concerns come into play, the constitutional
mandate has been one useful source of the states' statements of policy.'
A perceptive commentator properly views Dennis' opinion in Save
Ourselves. "He then interpreted the pertinent constitutional and statutory
* provisions to derive a specific, judicially enforceable standard of care." The
author later calls this a "constitutional-statutory standard.""' That is probably
as accurate a statement that can be made of what was produced in that case, a
result consistent with the purpose of the legislature. Courts not telling the
legislature what to adopt, but construing states in light of the general policies
stated in the Constitution and in other sources. Important additional sources of
56. Lee Hargrave, The Public Dust Doctrine: A Pleafor Precision, 53 La. L. Rev. 1535, 1551
(1993).
57. Norman Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 56.04, at 635 (4th ed. 1984).
58. Id. at 1156 (emphasis added).
59. See Comment, supra note 55, at 109.
60. See Charles S. McCowan, Jr., The Evolution of Environmental Law in Louisiana, 52 La. L.
Rev. 907, 913 (1992).
61. Nelea A. Absher, Note, Constitutional Law and the Environment: Save Ourselves. Inc. v.
Louisiana Environmental Control Commission, 59 Tul. L. Rev. 1557, 1568 (1985).
1998]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
authority used were federal laws: "For assistance in interpreting these require-
ments, the Save Ourselves opinion also referred the reader to federal and state
cases which have construed procedural requirements under NEPA and state acts
patterned after NEPA. Thus, the court clearly implied that the procedural
requirements of Louisiana's environmental laws are analogous to those of NEPA.
Indeed, in describing its standard, the court in Save Ourselves used language
nearly identical to that used in Calvert Cliffs to interpret NEPA's require-
ments."62
In this regard, the Louisiana position accords with the general view in the
United States: "In whatever terms the constitutional policy of environmental
protection is set forth, almost all state constitutional provisions make reference
to the legislature in particular or state government in general as an agent for
carrying out the policy."63
V. GAMBLING-ARTICLE XII, SECTION 6
Neither the state nor any of its political subdivisions shall conduct
a lottery. Gambling shall be defined by and suppressed by the
legislature.
The first sentence of the 1975 constitutional provision was a self-enforcing
prohibition which curbed the state and its subdivisions from conducting a lottery.
The ban reflected a continuation of anti-loftery sentiment that arose in the latter
part of the nineteenth century because of the corruption of the Louisiana Lottery
Company. The predecessor provision of the 1921 constitution was broader,
Article XIX, section 8 providing, "Lotteries and the sale of lottery tickets are
prohibited in this State." The new provision, however, only prohibited
governments from conducting lotteries; it did not prohibit licensing or otherwise
allowing a private lottery, which is what the Louisiana Lottery Company was.
No legislative attempt was made to permit a lottery without a constitutional
amendment. The present state lottery was authorized by an amendment adopting
Section 6(A).
At the same time CC/73 adopted the self-operative provision banning
lotteries, it adopted a less authoritative command in addressing other forms of
gambling. It simply instructed, in the second sentence, that the legislature define
and suppress gambling. This provision was the result of a debate which showed
the delegates knew they wee adopting an unenforceable mandate. The 1921
constitution had also provided in Article XIX, section 8, "Gambling is a vice and
62. Id. at 1571.
63. Bruce Ledewitz, The Challenge of and Judicial Responses to, Environmental Provisions in
State Constitutions, 4 Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law 33, 37 (1991). See also Robert
A. McLaren, Comment, Environmental Protection Based on State Constitutional Law: A Call for
Reinterpretation, 12 U. Haw. L. Rev. 123 (1990).
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the Legislature shall pass laws to suppress it." The supreme court, however,
concluded that the provision was not self-executing and that the only prohibited
gambling was what the legislature defined as such. In Gandolfo v. Louisiana
State Racing Commission," the court approved pari-mutuel betting at horse race
tracks. Indeed, the legislature has never banned all gambling; the criminal code
simply punished gambling conducted as a business.63 The result was a high-
sounding constitutional sermon that nonetheless allowed gambling blessed by the
legislature.
The CC/73 debate was quoted at length in Polk v. Edwards," the unani-
mous supreme court decision permitting the legislature to allow casino gambling,
riverboat casinos and video poker. The decision is consistent with the record of
debates, and indeed, the court could render no other principled interpretation of
the constitutional language.
But, might one ask how so apparently deceptive a provision could be
adopted? A provision that is quoted in the popular press who castigate the courts
and legislature for violating its spirit? To the purist, of course, provisions that
are not self-executing or limitations on the legislature simply do not belong in
a constitution. In the real world of constitutional conventions, however, such
provisions become part of the document; the myth and the hope may be more
important than the operative legal language.
The committees of CC/73, facing a provision which had no important effect,
and desiring to shorten the document, took no action to continue the 1921
provisions on gambling. No committee proposals on the subject were introduced,
resulting in a situation in which lotteries and other forms of gambling could be
permitted by law. Attention focused on this narrow topic as the convention
approached its closing deadline amid long workdays and late-night sessions. A
proposal by Delegate Planchard sought simply to add that neither the state nor
a political subdivision could conduct a lottery. He referred to the growth of
lotteries in the northeastern United States and stated his aim to stop such
developments in Louisiana. Delegate Bums then introduced an amendment to
return to the language of the former constitution. The debate then burst open.
Delegate Bums explained that his purpose was more political and moral than a
concern with a legal rule. He stated, after the obligatory reference to the
Louisiana Lottery Company scandals:
Now, I don't think where an amendment is not going to change
anything, it's not going to add anything on to the present law, it's not
going to put any further restrictions over and above what we already
have and as I say we're people that like horse racing, they're enjoying
horse racing, they're enjoying pari-mutuel betting. The people that like
bingo games are enjoying them, so why by the actions of this commit-
64. 227 La. 45, 78 So. 2d 504 (1954).
65. E.g., La. R.S. 14:90 (1997).
66. 626 So. 2d 1128 (La. 1993).
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tee, or this convention, especially with reference to the lottery article,
why do we want to go out of our way and invite the open and active
opposition of that larger percentage of the citizens of this state who are
absolutely, definitely opposed to lottery, that just as sure as we do it,
we're going to get that opposition and I'm not saying that as a threat
because they have documents here to show their sentiment.
But Delegate Burns knew that his proposal did not define gambling and that it
was up to the legislature to do so. He said, "This is not going to change one
thing that we don't have at the present time except that it will keep it in the
constitution and satisfy the voters when they go to the polls to vote on this
constitution." 68 Delegate Smith supported the proposal and emphasized the
political value of the provision in north Louisiana:
Well, I'm not an expert on the definition of gambling, but I know that
we should put this in-whether you're from North Louisiana or South
Louisiana-our people feel very strongly about this up in our area and
this is one of the things they will want in there. So, gentlemen, I feel
like we're going to hurt ourselves if we don't put this in our constitu-
tion."9
Some younger lawyer delegates were more explicit. Delegate Fayard said: "If
you think that it's politically expedient and it's necessary to adopt this to pass
this constitution, I can see the reason why you would vote this way. But, don't
get up here and say it does anything; it does nothing .... ." Delegate Jenkins
referred to it as "simply moralistic preaching" and "hypocritical." Delegate
Duval admitted it was pragmatic:
So, I don't think it will have any material effect on the operation of the
state. I think it's a purely pragmatic matter; it may facilitate the passage
of this document .... Therefore, for a purely pragmatic reason,
because it does not change the law at all, because we will operate as we
always have been operating, I urge that we adopt the amendment."'
A combination of pragmatists and moralists, worn out at the end of the day,
adopted the Burns amendment and restored the 1921 language. The next day,
Delegate Gravel proposed a compromise provision that was more straightforward
in that it omitted the moral condemnation of gambling as a vice and simply
stated the rule that was adopted.
67. Lee Hargrave, "Statutory" and "Hortatory" Provisions of the Louisiana Constitution ofI974,
43 La. L. Rev. 647, 679 (1983); IX Records: Convention Transcripts, supra note 10, at 3214.
68. IX Records: Convention Transcripts, supra note 10, at 3214.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 3217.
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Perhaps one could conjure a reverse-cynicism theory to deal with such
hortatory statements that might lead some voters to believe the language really
does something. Perhaps the courts could enforce them and require the
legislature to act. A type of estoppel theory that would penalize the delegates
for adopting such misleading provisions? But are they truly misleading?
Statements of aspiration may be used to determine the state's policies, as with
the environmental mandate. More important,. what principled and precise
standards could the courts develop to determine which types of gambling to
define as improper and which to allow? To outlaw all gambling, under some
generic definition the court might weave out of common law principles, would
make the provision self-enforcing and thus deceive other voters who were
knowledgeable and wanted to adopt, as Mr. Burns put it, the situation as it
existed at the time.
On a more serious level, a study of decisionmaking in CC/73 by Edward D.
Grant III in a Ph.D. dissertation 7' explains the desire to take the middle ground
in constitutional reform, as in this provision. He suggests the delegates had two
main goals-to adopt some reforms and to get them approved by the voters. He
states: "It is plausible, intuitively, that newly proposed documents which contain
either minor or major amounts of change will be rejected by the voters. Only
documents proposing a moderate degree of reform will be approved at the
polls.""7 The formula for voter approval appeared to be a proposed constitution
graced with a moderate degree of reform." "Almost everywhere, conventions
scrambled to protect the enshrinement of various 'sacred cows,' depending upon
local habit and prejudice."74 As Delegate Lance Womack stated, he would be
content if the document merely laid out the blueprint for "pretty good govern-
ment."75 Not necessarily good government, but "pretty good" government. The
unenforceable mandate was a useful device to accomplish these goals of the
delegates.
VI. FORCED HEIRSHIP; ARTICLE XII, SECTION 5
No law shall abolish forced heirship. The determination offorced
heirs, the amount of theforcedportion, and the grounds for disinherison
shall be provided by law. Trusts may be authorized by law, and a
forced portion may be placed in trust.
The self-enforcing first sentence, read in its normal sense, allowed the
legislature to do anything to forced heirship other than "abolish" it. The second
71. Grant. supra note 7.
72. Id. at 19.
73. Id. at 20.
74. Id. at 28.
75. Id. at 29.
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sentence elaborated that, in addition, the legislature was empowered to determine
without any limitations the persons who would be forced heirs and the amount
of the forced portion. Furthermore, the convention debates revealed the
understanding that the legislature was given full discretion to structure the
institution of forced heirship as it chose, so long as something remained. No
principled means of determining what had to remain was provided.
The section contrasted with the tone of voice used in Article I, section 5, the
provision dealing with the right to keep and bear arms. It also begins with a
strong statement: "the right of each citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be
abridged." That statement is also then qualified: "but this provision shall not
prevent the passage of laws to prohibit the carrying of weapons concealed on the
person." But here, the exception to the right which empowers the legislature to
limit the right is itself limited: legislative action to limit carrying concealed
weapons is limited to weapons "concealed on the person." In contrast, the
language in Article XII, section 5 gives the legislature power to determine forced
heirs and the forced portion and the grounds for disinherison without such a
limitation. The structure of the two articles thus indicates that the legislative
power over forced heirship was meant to be greater than the power to legislate
with respect to gun control.
Members of the Judiciary Committee and the Committee on Bill of Rights
and Elections had before them staff documents which suggested that the 1921
Constitution provision on forced heirship was not an effective limitation on
legislative power and did "not prevent the legislature from making changes in the
categories of forced heirs or in the portion of the deceased's estate which
constitutes the legitime."76 While the language cited to support this view may
have been dictum on the point, the language of Succession of Earhart" was
accepted as the existing position of the jurisprudence: "The words, 'no law shall
be passed abolishing forced heirship,' mean exactly what they say, in other
words, that forced heirship cannot be done away with wholly, wiped out or
destroyed. This provision does not prohibit the legislature from regulating or
restricting the rights of forced heirs.""8
Delegate Ford Stinson, representing the Committee on Bill of Rights and
Elections which proposed Article XII, section 5 toward the end of the conven-
tion, explained to the delegates: "Neither do they say that children will be forced
heirs of fathers and mothers and their ascending line. It will be left up to the
legislature."79 Delegate Max Tobias stated, "As I presently read Louisiana
constitution and statutes, the legislature could very simply say that each child is
76. Hargrave, supra note 67, at 659; Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections Staff Memo, July
31, 1973 at X Records: Committee Documents 134, 135. See also Judiciary Committee Staff Memo
No. 21, June 6, 1973 at XI Records: Committee Documents, supra note 46, at 358.
77. 220 La. 817, 57 So. 2d 695 (1952).
78. Id. at 824, 57 So. 2d at 697.
79. IX Records: Convention Transcripts, supra note 10, at 3073 (Jan. 3, 1974).
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a forced heir to the extent of one dollar."' o Delegate Dennery agreed with
Delegate Avant, in that "[t]here would be a system of forced heirship, but what
it consisted of, and all the refinements thereof, would be up to the legisla-
ture.'" As I stated in 1983:
A court which would be inclined to ignore this legislative history
(perhaps arguing that it does not necessarily reflect the intent of the
voters who adopted the document) and hold that some reasonable
fraction of legitime is required would be in a difficult position. There
are simply no traditional legal standards as to what share (percentage or
amount) of a deceased's patrimony is part of the forced portion, and
there are no legal standards as to who must be forced heirs. Lack of
certain judicial standards seems to be another reason supporting the
view that the legislature can severely erode the institution, as long as it
keeps some absolute minimum aspect of forced heirship. 2
Opponents of this view, depending primarily on a word analysis of the term
"abolish", argued there was some minimum level of forced heirship that had to
be kept. They recognized, of course, "The difficulty is in determining that
point."83 Moreover, the convention debate on forced heirship was cursory,
without considering the policy concerns that were sought to be preserved8" and
which might otherwise have been used to explain what the minimum provisions
to be kept would be. The absence of such a debate is explained by the fact that
the delegates knew they were adopting an unenforceable mandate, and that the
issue was to be left to the legislature.
When the legislature sought to limit forced heirship by statute, it kept
descendants as the favored persons, but limited the class to descendants under 23
years of age or who were incapacitated. 5 Though the language was not clear,
apparently the forced portion was not changed.
The supreme court, by a 4-3 decision in Succession of Lauga,"6 however,
found the statute violated the constitutional provision because it abolished the
"iessence" or "core values" of forced heirship, which it determined included
equality among descendants regardless of age or need. Justice Dennis wrote for
the majority and Justice Kimball wrote a strong dissent."7 The disagreement
between the justices was largely one of philosophy: fidelity to constitutional text
and purpose versus protecting fundamental rights defined in non-constitutional
80. Id. at 3075.
81. Id. at 3078.
82. Hargrave, supra note 67, at 660.
83. Katherine Spaht et al., The New Forced Heirship Legislation: A Regrettable "Revolution,"
50 La. L. Rev. 409, 414 (1990).
84. Id. at 416.
85. 1989 La. Acts No. 788; 1990 La. Acts No. 147.
86. 624 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1993).
87. Justices Marcus and Hall also dissented. Id. at 1 183.
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texts. Indeed, the majority opinion spends most of its efforts on historical
sources of forced heirship and on the 1921 constitutional provision. From those
sources, it draws out the core values of forced heirship which are not stated in
the 1975 constitutional text or in the debates during CC/73.
Indeed, the most interesting part of the opinion is its refusal to accept the
message of the convention debates on the basis that such recourse is not
necessary when the meaning of the text is clear. This is hardly the approach of
the court in scores of other cases, especially the approach in Polk v. Edwards"
decided almost contemporaneously. As Professor John Devlin wrote at the time,
"By coming to opposite conclusions in the two cases, the court sowed confusion
regarding how such provisions should be interpreted, and may have left itself
open to charges that its decisions in this area are more result-driven than
analytically consistent."89 He then tried to supply some justification for the
different results. Perhaps, he says, the case portends of movement away from
the maxim of interpretation that the legislature prevails unless the constitutional
limiting provision is "explicit." But that can hardly be reconciled with Justice
Dennis' opinion in the bond district case.9" To the extent that the convention
debates must be replaced with a look at the intent of the voters rather than the
delegates, he correctly points out that the best evidence of that is the intent of the
members of the convention. Even if we were to accept the premise, there is
evidence that convention debates were widely reported in the print and electronic
media.9
The argument that analysis of constitutional intent should focus on the
voters' intent rather than that of the delegates rests on the notion that the two are
different, a questionable assumption in light of the efforts made by the
convention to inform the public about the document, in light of this important
goal of securing approval.
CC/73's public information staff employed five full-time publicists. Their
"contributions included publishing a weekly convention newsletter, compiling
daily press releases, and producing informational spots for radio stations around
the state."92 The state's major newspapers in New Orleans, Baton Rouge,
Shreveport and Monroe, as well as the Associated Press, had reporters covering
all convention sessions. On three occasions, April, June, and October 1973,
88. 626 So. 2d 1128 (La. 1993).
89. John Devlin, Louisiana Constitutional Law, 54 La. L. Rev. 683, 717 (1994).
90. Board of Directors of La. Recovery Dist. v. All Taxpayers, 529 So. 2d 384 (La. 1988).
Although Article VII, section 6 of the Louisiana Constitution limits the state's ability "directly or
indirectly" to incur debt, the court upheld the power of a special district with boundaries identical
to that of the state to do so, under an expansive interpretation of legislative power.
91. Grant, supra note 7, at 136. "A professional staff member was assigned to each of three
areas: television publicity, radio publicity, and newspaper coverage. The staff prepared and supplied
TV films, radio spots, and news and feature stories to media organizations who did not have full-time
reporters at the convention. Across the state, 130 newspapers received daily and weekly releases
updating events in CC-73." Id. at 163.
92. Id.
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special convention committees traveled throughout the state to hear testimony at
public meetings and hearings. In April, it was the composite committee
composed of Chairman E. L. Henry and the chairs of the eight substantive
committees: "Packed houses met the delegates. Individual citizens and group
representatives testified on 'constitutional' subjects as varied as taxes, the
environment, an ombudsman for the state, racial discrimination, the court system,
and the particularization of 'God's Will' in a new document."93
This is not the place to reargue Lauga. Events since the decision have
shown the danger of proceeding as the majority did to place its perception of
fundamental values above constitutional text and purpose. This is especially true
when a court is construing a relatively young constitution, since the likelihood
of change in fundamental values in a short time is not great. After Lauga, the
voters expressed their fundamental values again in a constitutional amendment
which allowed changing forced heirship and limiting forced heirs to persons
under the age of 24 or who are incapacitated. They expressed their fundamental
acceptance of the change by a vote 68% in favor of the amendment, 758,608 for
and 364,692 against, suggesting that four judges' determination of those values
inconsistently with the purpose of the delegates was in error.9
The forced heirship provisions in the constitution present an additional
problem that goes beyond the misplaced approach of Lauga. To the purist who
would have preferred to have nothing on the subject in the constitution and to
have relied on legislative action in the area, the new-version of Article XII,
section 5 is even more difficult to deal with than the original. The amendment
version now reads:
Section 5(A) The legislature shall provide by law for uniform
procedures of successions and for the rights of heirs or legatees and for
testate and intestate succession. Except as provided in Paragraph (B) of
this Section, forced heirship is abolished in this state.
(B) The legislature shall provide for the classification of descen-
dants of the first degree, twenty-three years of age or younger as forced
heirs. The legislature may also classify as forced heirs descendants of
any age who, because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are
incapable of taking care of their persons or administering their estates.
The amount of the forced portion reserved to heirs and the grounds for
disinherison shall also be provided by law. Trusts may be authorized
by law and the forced portion may be placed in trust.
93. Id. at 160.
94. La. Voters Reject Only Two Amendments, Baton Rouge Advocate, Oct. 23, 1995, at 10A,
available in 1995 WL 6346300. The vote was 758,608 for and 364,694 against. It is ironic that the
voters expressed in the same election a distrust of judges. Efforts by judges to secure a constitutional
amendment to change their mandatory retirement age from 70 to 75 years by constitutional
amendment failed. Only 38% of the voters favored that amendment Id. Amendment no. 4
proposed changing the mandatory retirement age in Article V, section 23(B) from 70 to 75. It failed
by a vote of 410,226 for, to 671,805 against.
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The first sentence of 5(A) is unnecessary, since the legislature could adopt
such legislation by virtue of its general powers. The "legislature shall" mandate
is unenforceable to the extent it might be seen as requiring such legislation.
The second sentence of 5(A) is also arguably unnecessary if the object is to
allow the legislature to abolish forced heirship. It could do so without this
language. Presumably, though, the function of the sentence is as a lead in to
5(B) and part of an apparent attempt to require some forced heirship. But 5(B)
does not establish a self-enforcing provision specifying the aspects of forced
heirship that are required.
Indeed, 5(B) does not purport to determine the forced portion. It allows the
legislature to determine the fraction or portion that a forced heir is entitled to
receive.
Section 5(B) does purport to force continuation of some aspects of forced
heirship with respect to determining who shall be forced heirs. But the
constitution doesn't do so. It states that the "legislature shall" provide that
descendants of the first degree who are under 24 years are forced heirs. But
then, the "legislature may" name incapacitated descendants of any age as forced
heirs. The latter provision, of course, is merely permissive. But the first
provision presents the recurring problem of the unenforceable mandate. No
enforcement mechanism to make the legislature so act is provided. Granted, the
legislature did act to provide such legislation, but that could be repealed. In such
a case, a Lauga analysis does not come into play. Lauga depended on the
former language that forced heirship could not be abolished. That language is
gone from the constitution, Section 5(A) now abolishing it except as provided
in 5(B), and then 5(B)'s continuation is only a precatory mandate to the
legislature.
In any event, this state of affairs, judicial and legislative, does not
demonstrate careful drafting and clear determinations. It should be a general
lesson that mandates, though politically necessary in some situations, are a poor
substitute for clear and precise self-enforcing constitutional provisions. They
should be avoided to the extent possible.
(Vol. 58
